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Chapter 12

Christianity's Epicurean Temptation
Marc D. Guerra
One of the more striking characteristics of Christianity is the remarkable resilience
and flexibility the religion exhibits in the face of the kind of societal upheaval that
necessarily accompanies fundamental political change. Beginning with its
emergence within the Roman Empire, organized Christianity has not only survived
but, to greater and lesser degrees, flourished under an extraordinarily wide range
of political regimes. To cite only a few examples, the Christian religion has
managed to accommodate itself to such diverse sociopolitical arrangements as the
Roman Empire, medieval feudalism, the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian citystates, absolute monarchies, liberal democracies, and even, if only on the level of
basic survival, atheistic communist states.
Christianity's ability to accommodate itself to the sociopolitical arrangements of
such fundamentally different regimes is, in large part, due to its inherently
doctrinal nature. As a revealed religion, Christianity is finally less concerned with
delineating a detailed moral-political code by which its followers are to lead their
lives than it is with announcing "the Good News" of the arrival of the Kingdom of
Heaven. To be sure, the Christian religion does promulgate a law that includes a
substantive moral teaching. But the goal of Christianity's Law is the possession of
eternal blessedness, not the juridical establishment of a specific sociopolitical
program. Christianity in this respect stands in sharp contrast to the two other great
revealed religions of the West, Judaism and Islam. Whereas it is adherence to their
respective divine laws that marks the Jew and the Muslim as believers, Christianity
initially comes to sight as a transpolitical "sound doctrine."' The community of
Christian believers is bound together not by any comprehensive legal and social
system, but rather by a shared belief in a set of revealed doctrines. Justification
within Christianity therefore does not depend merely on the obligatory performance
oflegally sanctioned deeds, but on the purity and the steadfastness of a man's faith.
Precisely because they recognized the gospel's emphasis on the salvific role of
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faith, Christianity's early intellectual caretakers understood that the Sacred
Scriptures were in need of further theological refinement. The church fathers
recognized that since human beings were to be judged on the purity of their faith,
what has been revealed about God must be rendered as accurately and lucidly as
possible. Viewed from this perspective, Christianity's failure to provide either its
own paradigm for the correct ordering of society or to endorse any existing set of
arrangements is a direct consequence of its transpolitical nature.
Recently, however, a number of Christian thinkers have provocatively
questioned the legitimacy of the modem liberal regime. Liberal democracy has
been increasingly criticized not only for failing to support but also for actually
eroding the intellectual grounds on which the Christian faith is based. This
argument is forcefully advanced in Kenneth R. Craycraft's engaging and, at times,
jarring new book The American Myth ofReligious Freedom. 2 A former professor
of theology at St. Mary's University in San Antonio who is presently a student at
the Law School at Duke University, Craycraft here "sets out" to deconstruct "the
idea" of religious freedom in order to expose its "radically secular" roots.
It should be clear from the foregoing remarks that the argument of The American
Myth of Religious Freedom clearly falls outside of the familiar parameters of
mainstream religious and political thought. While the book's title suggests thatthe
work is concerned primarily with the American understanding of religious
freedom, its author advances an argument that is in truth directed not at America
or even the "liberal American idea" ofreligious freedom, but rather at the principle
ofliberalism itself. Kenneth Craycraft' s engaging book, in other words, challenges
the reader to consider the kind of untimely religious critique of liberalism that
characterized the Catholic Church's discourse for most of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.

The "lrreligion" of Religious Freedom
The American Myth of Religious Freedom begins with a discussion of how
pervasive "belief' in the idea of religious freedom is in present-day political
discourse. Craycraft, using the language of postmodern literary theory, repeatedly
refers to the idea of religious liberty as a "myth." The impact this "powerful
formative myth" has had and continues to have on the American psyche cannot be
exaggerated for Craycraft. On the one hand, "the myth" of religious freedom
originally served a "creative purpose" in the American regime. By articulating "a
set of symbols, rites, institutions, and stories that ... reflect how [the American
people would] see the world," it provided them with "a common story." On the
other hand, the power of this myth remains formative inasmuch as it continues to
"create" the "mindset . . . and prejudices" of future generations of American
citizens. The American myth of religious freedom paradoxically perpetuates itself ·
and the regime it helped found. 3 For Craycraft, the effect of this myth is so strong
that even those who claim that the American regime was founded on Christian
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principles typically cling to an "unquestioned belief' in the principle of religious
liberty. Insofar as conservative-minded Americans think of themselves as
Americans, they implicitly and inescapably "testify" to the truth of this myth.
Craycraft's analysis of the pervasiveness ofbeliefin religious liberty in America
is for the most part correct. But, as we shall see, Craycraft's postmodern reduction
of "the idea" of religious freedom to mere myth does not do justice to the partial
truth that is contained in this idea. For postmodernism's literary method of
mythological analysis dogmatically assumes that the idea of religious liberty can
be reduced to mere ideology. The flaw in Craycraft's postmodern approach, in
other words, is that it is methodologically incapable of taking seriously the
possibility that there is a considered thoughtfulness behind the political idea of
religious liberty.
Be that as it may, for Craycraft the problem with the myth ofreligious freedom
is that followed to its logical conclusion it "undermines ... belief in Christianity
defined in any interesting way.''4 That Craycraft is aware of the theoretical problem
the liberal principle ofreligious freedom poses to Christianity shows he has thought
about the relation ofliberalism to Christianity more seriously than the majority of
contemporary Christian theologians and political scientists. Rather than simply
accepting religious freedom as an unqualified good for religion, Craycraft has
taken the time to think through the argument behind that theory. Craycraft is thus
aware of the principle's original intentions as well as its actual implications.
The "liberal theory of religious freedom" institutionalizes the practice of
religious liberty by raising it up to the level of a universal principle. Consequently,
it first presents itself as a good not only for the political order but for religion as
well. To begin with, the theory has the obvious, salutary effect of curbing the threat
that human beings will be persecuted solely on religious grounds. Given the
bloodied history of religious strife that characterized life in early post-Reformation
Europe, the fact that public-spirited political thinkers sought to find an arrangement
that could lessen the likelihood of such conflict is more than understandable. What
is more, the theory of religious liberty seems to benefit religious practice as well.
The adherence to the religion of one's own choosing would appear to represent a
deeper commitment to one's faith. Thus, on the surface, the type of religion
practiced under the principle of religious freedom seems to be more pure, if only
because it reflects "the authentically free" choice of the "unencumbered self. " 5
But as Craycraft explains over several chapters, behind the theory's salutary
interest in the health of religious practice lies an implicit, willful rejection of the
truth of religion in general and of any one religion in particular. While not saying
so directly, Craycraft here draws on the ground-breaking work of the twentiethcentury political philosopher Leo Strauss in retracing how the chief architect of the
theory of religious liberty, John Locke, sought to move religion out of the public
sphere and relegate it to the private realm of civil society. As Craycraft repeatedly
observes, for Locke the place ofreligion in society "is the first problem of political
theory and practice.''6 Craycraft's ahistorical genealogy, however, fails to
acknowledge any legitimate historical or political basis for this concern in the early
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modem period. Craycraft goes so far as to claim that the motivation behind the
theory had "nothing to do with social or historical expediency and everything to do
with a particular moral, religious, and political theory."7 In contrast to mainline
political theorists who view the Two Treatise of Government as Locke's most
influential work, Craycraft takes A Letter Concerning Toleration to be his "most
important contribution to ... modern political theory."8
In the Letter, Locke extrapolates from his argument about life within ''the
hypothetical state of nature" the moral and religious principles that the modern
state would use to go about "privatizing religious belief." Building on the
anthropology of Thomas Hobbes, which grounds political life on a pre-moral fact,
namely, man's fear ofa violent death at the hands of another, Locke identified the
desire for "comfortable self-preservation" as the true grounds of civil society.
Locke thus derived from this pre-moral fact the further conclusion "that religion
is something one chooses from a position of moral, social, and religious
autonomy. " 9 As Craycraft' s argument shows, the reason why Locke's theory could
require that religious belief be privatized-that is, that religious belief has no
explicit role to play in public life-was because Locke was "openly indifferent" to
the various truth claims that separated religions. The animating concern of
"liberalism's Lockean theory of religious liberty" is thus neither philosophical nor
theological, but overtly political. Locke's principal aim was to secure a peaceful
arrangement among religions by according them all the same degree of freedom
and political status, and thus "relativizing" all religious belief. In securing such an
arrangement, liberalism proudly, and as Craycraft notes, falsely claims to have
solved the theoretically irresolvable "theologico-political problem." 1° Far from
having the best interests of religion in mind, Locke's principle of religious
toleration presented the liberal state with a time bomb designed to "privatize and
marginalize orthodox" religious belief. 11
Liberalism's theory of religious freedom is thus, according to Craycraft, a wolf
in sheep's clothing. It feigns a concern for the well-being ofreligious belief but in
fact employs a fictive anthropology to liberate man from what it sees as the
tyrannical hold of religious belief. Craycraft develops this point at length in the
book's final chapter, titled "There's No Such Thing as Religious Freedom, and It's
No Big Deal." As the chapter's title suggests, Craycraft here follows the lead of the
postmodern literary theorist Stanley Fish. What Craycraft successfully brings to
light is the typically overlooked fact that the theory of religious freedom is actually
only a part, albeit an important one, of the larger "project of liberalism." Indeed,
despite what the title of his book suggests, the true target of Craycraft' s criticism
is not the American idea of religious freedom or the practice of religious liberty,
but liberalism itself. In particular, Craycraft objects to liberalism's claim to have
"found a set of objective, neutral principles, by which objective universal
judgments can be made." 12
The real strength ofCraycraft' s critique rests on his undeveloped recognition that
the liberal regime poses a new type of challenge to the integrity of Christianity.
Craycraft understands that American liberal democracy is something new under the
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sun-it is not merely a variation of the ancient republican model. In fact, for all
practical purposes, modern liberal democracy is incapable of being understood
simply within the framework of the more or less legitimate regimes traditionally
articulated by Aristotelian political science.13 Because it raises the principle of
democracy, consent, to the level of the single legitimizing principle in human life,
liberal democracy effectively breaks with the sempiternal natural cycle of regimes
set forth in Aristotle's Politics. Compared to modern liberal democracy, Periclean
Athens and republican Rome were both aristocratic regimes. As the great analyst
of democracy Alexis de Tocqueville observed, the predemocratic and democratic
worlds differ "almost in kind." Consequently, the types of men that each world
tends to produce "are like two distinct orders of human beings, each of which has
its own merits and defects, its own advaqtages and its own evils." 14
In Craycraft's view, the effectual truth of the liberal regime's relation to religion
is that it seeks to establish "irreligion as the official state-endorse[ d] religious
opinion." 15 The liberal regime's emphasis on consent has the effect of calling into
question not only the transpolitical claim of Christian faith, as every regime does,
but also the very ground on which this transpolitical claim is made. In an unsubtle
and heavy-handed chapter titled "From Theory to Practice: Madison and
Jefferson," Craycraft argues that the "great task" of establishing irreligion as the
official state religion of America was taken up by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. Through a process of"literary genealogy," Craycraft tries to show how
these two "great practitioners" of Locke went about "enshrining" his antireligious
doctrine in the First Amendment. Craycraft here paints with extremely broad and
often misleading strokes; he too easily identifies or perhaps reduces both Jefferson
and Madison to Locke and thus overstates the element of genuinely Lockean
thought in the American founding. Thus, in making his case against liberalism's
theory of religious liberty, Craycraft refuses to be deterred by stubborn facts such
as Jefferson's description of the Declaration oflndependence "as an expression of
the American mind" and not just of his own thought. Likewise, Craycraft is
unwilling to admit that while it is not wholly Christian, Madison's moving account
of liberty and conscience in the Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments is in some sense indebted to the Christian understanding of these
things. 16
Craycraft' s exaggerated account of the Lockean dimension of the American
founding explains why he views the Supreme Court's decision on the strict
separation of church and state in Everson v. Board of Education ( 1947) as
accurately reflecting the framers' position. For Craycraft, religious conservatives
who think the Court's decision woefully distorted the framers' argument on
church-state relations typically make the mistake of identifying the religious
sentiment of the general population at the time of the founding with the stance of
the founders themselves:
Now it is probably unarguable that the broadly popular sentiment at the
time of the American Founding was that the state ought to protect
religious freedom ... but to claim that the intention of the Constitution
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of the United States is to protect religion from the state rather than the
state from religion is simple legal and historical fiction. 17

Over and against the vacuity of the liberal theory of religious freedom, Craycraft
holds up the "authentic grounds of religious freedom" articulated in the Second
Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty. Like the liberal myth of
religious freedom, the council's Declaration also attempts to establish "a full range
of religious freedom" for all human beings. But in contrast to the groundless
character of the liberal notion of religious freedom, the Roman Catholic Church's
teaching is able to provide a solid basis for this freedom by reserving ''the highest
order of freedom for itself as Church." The Declaration on Religious Liberty does
this by carving out for the church a particular kind of freedom, one that is grounded
in its "distinct right" as the repository of religious and moral truth. As the unique
repository of Christ's revelation, the freedom that the church exercises supersedes
the freedom possessed by the non-Christian.
Craycraft is undoubtedly right to draw attention to the fact that the Vatican
Council's Declaration provides the principle ofreligious liberty with a truer, more
solid foundation than its impoverished Lockean counterpart. But again it must be
pointed out that Craycraft provides a rather one-sided and simplistic reading of the
history of religion in America. On the basis of reading Craycraft, for example, one
would get the impression that the American Revolution was explicitly and
unapologetically atheistic. But this simply is not the case. In contrast to the vitriolic
antireligious spirit of the French Revolution, the American Revolution
demonstrated a greater openness to and respect for religion. Furthermore, while the
heterodox nature of Madison's and Jefferson's religious beliefs has been
recognized for some time now, the same cannot be said of all of the
founders-something Craycraft' s argument implies. Craycraft simply ignores or
thinks unimportant the fact that while the founding fathers may not have been
"orthodox Christians" (an ambiguous phrase that Craycraft in the end appears to
identify with Catholics), the majority were in fact Christians of some sort.
Craycraft' s argument simply cannot account for the role played in the founding by
mainline Protestants such as James Wilson or even those Unitarians who believed
in a providential, Creator God. Simply put, what Craycraft refuses to recognize is
that not all of the founders worshipped at the altar of modem rationalist
philosophy.
Along similar lines, Craycraft's effort to reduce the history of religion in
America to the effects of Madison's and Jefferson's Lockeanism is also misplaced.
The actual history of religion in America is far more complex. Craycraft has a
tendency to overstate the degree to which political life, even modem political life,
can be understood simply as the application of theory to practice. Craycraft
consequently never takes seriously the possibility that the American founders may
have arrived at a prudential practical solution to the problem of religious belief. A
more accurate and more subtle appraisal of the American regime would have to
acknowledge that America's lived history of religion is richer than the regime's
partially Lockean theory. In short, what he fails to realize is that the American
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regime's prudential accommodation ofreligious belief defies any purely theoretical
account.
Craycraft toys with, but finally rejects, this possibility in a provocative chapter
titled "Catholic Irony? John Courtney Murray on Religious Freedom." Taking his
cue from Peter Augustine Lawler's original reading of We Hold These Truths,
Craycraft here offers a similar, and in some sense derivative, reading of Murray's
famous book. 18 Craycraft's purpose is to show that Murray's famed
"reconciliation" between the moral and religious demands of Christianity and the
principles of American democracy is "ironic." Craycraft, rightly it seems to me,
sees the interpretive key for understanding the argument of We Hold These Truths
as being revealed in Murray's remark in the introduction that
the question is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism is compatible
with American democracy. The question is invalid as well as
impertinent; for the matter of its position inverts the order of values. It
must, of course, be turned round to read, whether American democracy
is compatible with Catholicism. 19

Craycraft here sets forth a compelling case that Murray was not as unaware of
the non-Christian, and especially non-Catholic, elements in the American founding
as he is commonly thought to have been. Whereas conventional wisdom sees
Murray as trying to accommodate Catholic teaching to the political principles set
forth in the Declaration, Craycraft argues that precisely the opposite is true. Far
from attempting to forge some type of synthesis between the two, or suggesting
that Catholic thought could deepen or prudently elevate Jefferson's thought,
Craycraft's Murray actually "rejected" America's constitutional understanding of
religion "out of hand." For Craycraft, "Murray [was] not accepting the essential
philosophy of Jefferson and improving it with a little Catholic theology." Rather,
he was trying to offer "a distinctively Christian understanding of how a Christian
can live in America. " 20
Craycraft is right to call attention to the elegance and subtlety of the argument
of We Hold These Truths. But he errs inasmuch as he mistakes Murray's subtlety
for "irony." Murray's argument is not fueled by the kind of postmodern irony that
delights in hiding the fact that it "rejects" the American principles "out of hand,"
but rather by the kind of theoretical-practical sobriety that seeks to moderate the
excesses of American democracy from within. 21 As Lawler points out, Murray's
true genius consisted in his recognition that as a political act, the American
founding finally could not claim theoretical coherence. Murray recognized that
despite all efforts to the contrary, the various moral, religious, and political
principles articulated in the American founding did not, and could not, form a
theoretically coherent whole-hence Jefferson spoke of "the American mind" and
not the "American philosophy." This then explains why Murray affirmed a tension
at the heart of the founding between "a voluntarist idea of law as will" and "a
tradition of natural law as inheritance . . . as an . . . intellectualist idea. " 22 The
problem of radical autonomy or liberty severed from any end that plagues America
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today was thus "a possibility . . . inherent from the beginning. " 23 What Craycraft
fails to appreciate, in other words, is that Murray's way of writing has more in
common with the sophisticated moderation of a Burke than with the dilettantish
irony of the postmodernist.
What are we thus to make of the fact that Murray chose subtly to elevate
America's liberal principles whereas Craycraft chooses to shout his rejection of
these principles from the rooftop? Does not Murray's choice to moderate the
American regime from within say something profound about his understanding of
the relation of the Christian to the regime in which he lives? Conversely, does not
Craycraft's refusal to use the same kind of politically responsible or prudent
rhetoric finally suggest something entirely different?
This brings us to the real flaw in Craycraft's argument. The fundamental problem
with Craycraft' s book is not in its hyperbolic claim that Christians ought not accept
"the principles of the American Founding"24 nor in its odd suggestion that the
"degeneration" of the "liberty of constitutionalism ... is not ... important to
Christians."25 Such remarks, no matter how politically irresponsible, are in the end
only the products of Craycraft's remarkable belief that Christians actually have no
genuine stake in political life. The reason why Craycraft can claim that the
nonexistence of religious liberty is "no big deal" is actually because he believes
that citizenship has no real role to play in the life of the Christian.
Christianity is, for Craycraft, not merely transpolitical but in fact radically
apolitical. Christians consequently have "no real stake" in the political order. Nor,
for that matter, do they have any interest in "changing it in any fundamental
way."26 Quite the contrary, the Christian's only real "interest is ... to persuade
people to believe by witnessing to the resurrection of Christ, who ... relativizes all
political theories and who commands that people bind themselves to no one."27
What is startling about Craycraft's claim is the remarkable similarity it bears to the
atheistic doctrine of Epicurus. Like Epicureanism, Craycraft's position does more
than simply depreciate the importance of political life. Craycraft does not limit
himself to saying that Christians should not be consumed by political life, but
rather that they have "no real stake" or "interest" in it. Christians' concerns with
political life are solely negative; it should not disturb or interfere with their own
private concerns. Craycraft, for all practical purposes, agrees with the description
of the Christian that the anti-Christian Rousseau offers in the penultimate chapter
of the Social Contract: he is a citizen only in the most attenuated sense of the term.
Craycraft's apolitical stance explains why he fails to articulate any positive
political vision. Strictly speaking, Craycraft's argument is neither genuinely
conservative, since there is nothing in liberalism he wants to preserve, nor
authentically reactionary, since he does not call for a return to an earlier form of
clerical politics. It is rather entirely critical. For Craycraft, what matters is only that
Christians be allowed to live their lives as Christians.
Paradoxically, by not addressing the question of citizenship, Craycraft departs
from the very tradition of Christian political reflection he sees himselfupholding.
Christianity traditionally has recognized that because of its doctrinal nature it must
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look outside of itself for its political form. But with this realization comes a
challenge. How does one account for Christian participation in political life if
human beings ultimately are ordered to a good that transcends the political?
Generally speaking, Christianity has offered two types of responses to this
question, the Augustinian and the Thomistic. By offering a brief sketch of these
two positions, we bring into sharper focus the distinctively Christian reasons for
rejecting Craycraft's call for apolitical withdrawal.

The Two Poles of Christian Citizenship
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The complicated relationship Christianity has to political life had become apparent
as early as one century after Christ's death. The anonymous Letter to Diognetus,
for example, describes Christians as "aliens" for whom "every foreign land is their
fatherland, and yet for them every fatherland is a foreign land since . . . [their] true
citizenship is in heaven." Despite this fact, Christians ought to "live in their own
countries ... have a share in everything as citizens and ... obey the established
laws. " 28 But as the overall argument of the Letter to Diognetus makes clear, it is
taken for granted that the Christian faithful would participate in political life. The
author of the Letter thus does not attempt to give any particular reason why
Christians would or should participate in politics. The Christian thinker who would
be the first to take up this argument in a serious way was St. Augustine .
It is ofno small significance that St. Augustine formulated his teaching about the
actual grounds of Christian citizenship precisely at the time when Christianity was
being blamed for the inglorious sacking of Rome by Alaric and the Goths. St.
Augustine himself states in his Retractationes that he was first moved to write The
City of God out of a desire to defend Christianity from this charge. 29 St.
Augustine's aim in writing The City of God was in fact twofold: (1) to argue that
Rome and not Christianity was actually responsible for the empire's recent
setbacks, and (2) to show public-spirited Romans that they could convert to the
Christian faith and still be good citizens.
St. Augustine's famous argument that the day-to-day life of the Christian is
marked by a kind of dual citizenship in which he is at one and the same time a
member of the "City of Man" and a citizen of the "City of God" is based on his
reading of chapter 13 of St. Paul's Letter to the Romans. St. Paul, there, asserts that
the Christian, who views God as his highest authority, must also be obedient to
civil authorities, since God has appointed them as His political ministers on earth. 30
Through temporal rulers, God makes use of civil society as a coercive means for
controlling, or at least lessening, the effects of evil in the world. What is more, God
has entrusted temporal rulers with the care of those material goods that all human
beings, the Christian and non-Christian, need to make their way in this life. In
contrast to the majority of men, the Christian does not obey the temporal ruler
simply out of fear that he might be punished. 31 Quite the contrary, the Christian
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views his relation to the political authority "positively" and thus looks on his
"political obligations" as something approximating a religious duty. 32
There is, however, for St. Augustine a still deeper reason why Christians are to
take part in political life. Ultimately the political actions the Christian performs as
a citizen are "rooted" in the demands of the theological virtue of charity.
Christianity's injunction that one should love one's neighbor as himself-the exact
opposite of the asocial injunction ofEpicureanism-meant that the Christian was
obligated to devote himself to the good of his fellow citizen with an intensity that
had yet to be seen in the ancient world. The virtue of charity required that if one
truly was to love God one also had to love all those who God wants to be saved.
But St. Augustine, also, was aware that if such love was to mean anything it could
not simply take the form of an abstract love ofhumanity. St. Augustine thus spoke
of "the order of charity," which extends from those in one's immediate family up
through and including those fellow members of one's political community. In
practical terms, "the order of charity" meant that while the gospel charged that "all
men were to be loved equally," one principally has to care for those men "who are
most closely bound to you by place, time, or opportunity."33 There was, for St.
Augustine, a charitable reason then to defend civilization against barbarism, to side
with the vices of the Romans over against the savageness of the Goths. The virtue
of charity, in other words, obliged the Christian to care for his fellow citizen's
physical and psychic well-being, to care for him "as a whole embracing both a soul
and a body. " 34
The actual ground of Christian citizenship would thus find its first, and arguably
most explicitly theological, articulation in St. Augustine's thought. For St.
Augustine, Christianity was able to transform the classical notion of citizenship by
raising it to the level of a religious duty. By so doing, it effectively revealed that
nothing else was capable of producing
such provincial administrators, such husbands. such wives, such
parents, such sons, such masters, such slaves, sucll kings, such judges,
and finally such tax-payers and collectors of public revenue as Christian
teaching requires them to be, and let them dare say this teaching is
opposed to the welfare of the state, or, rather, let them even hesitate to
admit that it is the greatest safety of the state. 35

St. Thomas, who in contrast to St. Augustine Hwed within a recognizably
Christian social order, approached the question of Christian citizenship from a
different direction. Whereas St. Augustine spoke of citizenship in terms of its
charitable foundations, St. Thomas, following Aristotle, viewed politics as being
an essential part of human life. 36 St. Thomas, unlike St. Augustine, could therefore
view political life as natural to man. "Man," St. Thomas affirmed, is "by nature
both a social and political animal."37
However, while man is the most social and political of all animals, he is also the
most physically needy. And it is this fact that first inclines him to live in society.
By nature, the first society to which man belongs is the family or "the household."
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Yet the good of the family is at best only "a partial good," since its principle aim
is the procurement of those goods that allow for and sustain life. But even the
family, ruled as it is by economics or the art of household management, is
incapable of securing all the goods human beings need to survive. Consequently,
St. Thomas saw the family as being completed by the political community, which
being the greater and the more perfect community both incorporates and subsumes
all lesser communities to its own end. 38
But because he is also a rational animal, it is not sufficient merely that man
"lives, but that he lives well."39 Indeed, as St. Thomas states in his discussion of the
natural law, man's distinctively human natural inclination inclines him both "to
know the truth and to live in society.''40 Once again following Aristotle, St. Thomas
believed that such genuine human flourishing could occur only within the political
community, "the most perfect ofall human societies."41 Unlike the household, the
political community attains a level of self-sufficiency. But what is more important,
however, is that while the end of the family is the promotion oflife, the end of the
political community is the cultivation of virtue in human beings. And this elevated
good is "common" to all citizens. St. Thomas in fact bases his notion of citizenship
on the recognition that the type of virtue that develops from engaging in such
activities as self-rule or ruling and being ruled in turn are important parts of any
genuinely human life. The good habits instilled in those who live under wellordered and just laws, something that takes on slightly greater importance in
Christianity given its transpolitical claim, represent authentic human goods. As a
result, St. Thomas views the common good as constituting the "proper," over and
against the merely private, good of the citizen. 42 To be sure, St. Thomas believed
that the kind of natural perfection that citizenship cultivates is inferior to the
supernatural perfection that can come about only through the reception of God's
grace. But insofar as grace does not destroy but perfects nature, it remains true that
man's spiritual perfection does not negate the legitimate, natural perfection that
occurs within political life. Thus, for St. Thomas, only the man who is "depraved,
a beast as it were ... or the man who is better than a man, a god as it were," is
capable of living outside of civil society. 43

Conclusion
Despite his argument to the contrary, Craycraft admits that Christians cannot
simply withdraw from political life. How else can one explain why he has taken the
time to write a work ofpolitical theory that passionately warns Christians about the
theological dangers of liberalism. This inconsistency in fact points to the real
source of his objection to the liberal regime. On the surface, Craycraft faults
liberalism for falsely believing that it has found a solution to the theologicopolitical
problem. The liberal regime, however, can make this claim only by denying the
tension that persists between the requirements of political life and the duties of
religious belief. But in his own way, Craycraft wants to do the same thing. In the
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final analysis, what he objects to is the fact that the liberal regime refuses to
acknowledge the authority and the primacy of the truths contained in Christian
revelation. Stated differently, Craycraft is critical of the liberal political order
precisely because it fails to take "the truth claim" of Christianity seriously. But
what Craycraft's criticism fails, or is perhaps unwilling, to recognize is that the
political order can only look at religion from the perspective of the political order.
To acknowledge this point is not to reduce all faiths to civil religions or to view
them solely in terms of their utility. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that the
political order as the political order has nothing to say about the truth of a particular
religion. To expect more than this from the political order, which is what Craycraft
repeatedly does, is to assume that the theologicopolitical problem can be solved.44
What Craycraft seems to call for is for the political order to be ruled by a
philosopher-king, or a theologian-king, who divines the truths of a religion and
structures the entire political community around them. This is ultimately what it
would mean to have a political community that both embodies and upholds the
principles of religious liberty set forth in the Vatican Council's Declaration. And
it goes without saying that such an arrangement requires one to go far beyond the
requirements and limits of the order of charity.
What is most regrettable about Craycraft' s extremist apolitical conclusions is that
they will allow some critics to overlook the important question about the
relationship between Christianity and liberal democracy that his book raises. The
analysis of the origins and ends of the liberal regime in The American Myth of
Religious Freedom should raise troubling questions for those Christians who
dogmatically assume that liberal democracy is the only form of government
compatible with Christianity. But regrettably, by framing his question in such a
polarizing way-should Christianity endorse liberal democracy or reject
it?-Craycraft only succeeds in obfuscating the fact that Christianity's original
rapprochement with liberal democracy was prudential.
Craycraft's book demonstrates that what Christianity most needs today is
political theorists and theologians who neither uncritically celebrate liberal
democracy nor reject it out of hand. Contemporary Christianity is best served by
theologians and political theorists who retain a certain critical distance from liberal
democracy, even as they praise its virtues and possibilities. The merit of such
thinkers is that they affirm the decency of liberal democracy and its various
attendant goods: civic peace, religious freedom, self-government, constitutionalism,
while refusing to make idols of them. Such critical friends ofliberal democracy are
profoundly aware of the fact that liberty worthy of the name must be ordered
liberty. The Christian political theorist or theologian, in other words, is presently
called on to perform the necessary and salutary task of reminding liberal
democracy about something it once knew-that it relies on inherited .
extrademocratic goods, such as religion and morality, for its health and survival.45
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